DILEMMAS OF POLYGRAPH STIPULATIONS
David Katz*
I. INTRODUCTION

The polygraph or "lie detector" is designed to detect falsehoods,
but its reliability and hence its value to the judiciary are matters of
continuous dispute. 2 Indeed, most courts refuse to admit polygraph
results into evidence, 3 citing as support a general lack of acceptance of
the technique by the scientific community.4 Judicial reluctance to
admit polygraph evidence is only partly the result of the technical
deficiencies of the instrument. Widespread underqualification of
polygraph examiners, who play a significant role in administering the
test and evaluating the results, also has contributed to the judiciary's
unwillingness to admit such evidence.
Regardless of the deficiencies of the technique, there appears to
be an emerging trend toward favoring the admissibility of polygraph
testimony when the parties so stipulate. 5 This writing questions the
wisdom of and recommends caution in admitting such testimony by
stipulation. In order to present the stipulation process in this light, the
article will review current standards for admissibility of scientific
evidence, Part II; describe the method of administering the polygraph

B.A., The American University: J.D., Duquesne University: M.A., State University of
New York at Albany: L.L.M., National Law Center of The George WVashington University.
See inIra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
2 See United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161. 170 (8th Cir. 1975) (polygraph results
inadmissible as evidence since not presently accepted by scientific community nor shown to be
sufficiently reliable), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 923 (1976): United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp.
510, 514 (D. Md. 1973) (analytical difficulties of polygraph technique mandate exclusion of
evidence resulting therefrom); Abbell, Polygraph Evidence: The Case Against Admissibility in
Federal Criminal Trials. 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29. 30 (1977) (technical and legal resources
require policy of exclusion of polygraph results in federal criminal trials be continued). But see
Abrams, Polygraphy Today, 3 NAT'L J. Clxt. DEF. 85. 105 (1977) (polygraph results should be
admitted into evidence when test is administered by qualified examiner): Pemberton, Polygraph:
Modern Rules and Videotape Technology to Promote the "Search For Truth "in Criminal Trials.
7 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 35 (1981) (advocating use of polygraph procedure in federal courts where
coherent standards for admissibility are established).
I See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 166 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 923 (1976); United States v. Russo, 527 F.2d 1051, 1059 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 906 (1976); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); State v. Saia, 172
Conn. 37, 41-42, 372 A.2d 144, 147 (1976); Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339, 340-41 (Fla. 1953);
Stack v. State, 234 Ga. 19, 21-22, 214 S.E.2d 514, 517-18 (1975).
' See infra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 69-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of the stipulation process.
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test, Part III; illustrate the severe limitations of the technique, Part
IV; and specifically address the problems associated with the stipulation process, Part V. It also will present the constitutional issues which
have arisen with respect to the admissibility of the test results, Parts
VI and VII; and finally, will offer a number of legislative suggestions
for ensuring the proper use of stipulated polygraph results, Part VIII.
II.

STANDARDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY

The development of standards for the admissibility of polygraph
evidence began in 1923 with the decision in Frye v. United States,6 in
which a per se exclusion was ordered. In Frye, the defendant offered
testimony of an expert who conducted a deception test. 7 The court
noted the novelty of the admissibility question before it and, applying8
the general standard utilized for admission of scientific evidence,
required the proponents of such evidence to demonstrate "general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."9 Since physiological and psychological authorities disapproved of the proffered test,
the court forbade its use at trial.10
The "general acceptance" test functions as a documentation procedure. Instead of authorizing a detailed presentation appraising the
equipment's theoretical and practical sufficiency, it assesses the level
of approval in the scientific community. This standard, however, has
certain limitations. Acceptance levels among experts vary," and
courts may find it difficult to determine which single individual fully
represents the field's opinion. In Frye, for instance, the evidence was
rejected on the basis of the testimony of physiological and psychologiwould have been
cal authorities.' 2 A different conclusion more likely
3
utilized.'
been
had
experts
polygraph
drawn if
- 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
7 Id. at 1014. The test in Frye measured systolic blood pressure. Id. at 1013. The theory
asserted was that the test accurately demonstrated the change in emotions associated with an
attempt at concealment of the truth, and accordingly, that the results proved the defendant's
innocence. Id. at 1013-14. Today's polygraph is more complex. It measures blood pressure, skin
resistance, muscle movements, pulse, and breathing. See J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND
DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE DErECTOR") TECHNIQUE 5 (2d ed. 1977); see supra notes 29-30
and accompanying text.
8 Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
§

Id.

10 Id.
1l See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
12 Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
11 See United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 690-91 (D.D.C.) (acknowledging benefit
from inquiring among polygraph experts for verification of reliability), rev'd per curiam, 475
F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also Levitt, Evaluation of the "Lie Detector." 40 IowA L. REV.
440, 457 (1955) (suggesting psychologists or psychiatrists are usually unfit to evaluate polygraph).
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Regrettably, courts often focus on general acceptance rather than
on the accuracy of the technology. When a court is reasonably assured
a procedure is accepted by the particular field to which it belongs, an
adequate foundation may be formed for admission by judicial notice
under the assumption that the validity of the procedure is verified by
its legitimacy in the field.14 It is ill-conceived, however, to bar conclusions of qualified experts whose opinions differ from those held by the
larger community. General acceptance should act as a standard for
judicial notice, but it is a mistake to employ it to bar relevant challenges to the field's opinion.
A more reasoned approach measures the polygraph by its relevancy. Professor McCormick suggests that " '[g]eneral scientific acceptance' is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of scientific
'' 5
facts, but not a criterion for admissibility of scientific evidence.
Under the McCormick approach, expert testimony may be admitted
on- either of two bases: by judicial notice when a legitimate field
supports the conclusions as facts, or by any relevant opinion proffered
by a qualified expert, even when unsupported by the larger community. Unless the testimony is excludable for other reasons, such as
undue prejudice, confusion, or unwarranted consumption of judicial
time,16 its admissibility is not governed solely by the viewpoint of the
particular field to which it belongs.' 7 This standard protects the philosophical concern for accuracy by permitting challenges to any imprecise assumptions in the scientific community.
The federal rules of evidence may be viewed as supporting
McCormick's outlook. The rules permit judicial notice of any fact
"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. "18 Essentially, general recognition by respected scientific sources is sufficient to admit

14 As the Frye standard assumes accuracy from field opinion, the Federal Rules of Evidence
allow judicial notice when the issue is generally known or verified by traditionally accepted
sources. FED. R. EVID. 201 (b) ("A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known . .. or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned"). But see
State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 504 (Me. 1978) (authorizing admission of newly developed
scientific principles even though general acceptance was absent).
15 C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203, at 491 (2d ed. 1972). Some
courts appear to be moving away from the Frye standard and closer to the McCormick standard.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 424-33, 313 N.E.2d 120, 123-28 (1974)
(creating exception to general acceptance test where safeguards to reduce potential for abuse
were shown); see also United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
11 See FED. R.EVID. 403.
17 C. McCoRMICK, supra note 15, § 203, at 491.
isFED. R.EvID. 201 (b).
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into evidence any technological process.' 9 Where such recognition
exists, the only remaining issue is whether the instrument, under the
particular facts, was maintained and operated properly by a qualified
witness. The technological device may thus be introduced by judicial
notice as a scientific fact.
Prior to a judge rendering a preliminary decision approving an
expert's qualifications, 20 the federal rules require that the proponent
of the testimony make a showing of the following two elements: 1)
that the expert has scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge in the subject area and 2) that the testimony is of such a nature as
to assist the trier of fact. 21 In cases in which polygraph evidence is to
be introduced, these requirements mandate a review of the operator's
ability 22 and the validity of the test's underlying theory. 23 Should
either be found unacceptable, the testimony is excludable. If, however, the theory of the test and the operator's qualifications are accepted by the court, the only issue requiring resolution is whether the
24
proffered evidence renders any material fact more or less probable.
If this is established successfully, the testimony may be admitted
provided its probative value is not outweighed substantially by undue
prejudicial effects or needless delay. 25 Thus, the federal rules, like
McCormick, view admissibility of scientific evidence in terms of judicial notice and relevance.
Under both the Frye and McCormick approaches, admissibility is
based upon the legitimacy of the procedure. Frye utilizes the scientific
community's opinion as the basis for presumed accuracy while
McCormick effectively analyzes the machine's abilities in order to
determine if it is sufficiently reliable to be relevant at trial.
Finally, admissibility also may be based on stipulation by the
parties. 26 When both sides agree to the admission of polygraph results,

'"See, e.g., Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J. Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (App. Div. 1950). In Cortese,
then New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Brennan, allowed judicial notice of a blood grouping test
because there existed "general recognition of the accuracy and value of the tests when properly
performed by persons skilled in giving them." Id. at 157, 76 A.2d at 720.
21 See FEo. R. EVID. 104(a) (preliminary questions concerning qualifications of witness are to
be determined by court).
2 1 FED. R. EvIt. 702. Even when the polygraph operator possesses specialized knowledge, it
is this author's position that the testimony cannot assist the trier of fact since reliability cannot be
established. See supra notes 43-68 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
23 See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
24 FED. R. EviD. 401, 402.
25 FED. R. EvID. 403. For a discussion of Rule 403 as applied to polygraphs, see Abbell, supra

note 2, at 50-54.
26 See infra notes 69-111 and accompanying text.
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courts tend to acquiesce even though absent the stipulation the identical results would be inadmissible as unreliable. 27 It is important to
note that unlike Frye and McCormick, stipulation employs no accuracy criteria. It is based on the ability of the parties to agree, not the
correctness of the results. To understand the problems inherent in this
use of the stipulation process, the polygraph examination and its
numerous deficiencies must be examined in detail.
III.

THE POLYGRAPH

28

The polygraph charts physiological changes in blood pressure,
skin resistance, respiration patterns, and muscular movements. 29 Each

of these variables acts as a manifestation of emotion. Taken together,
they demonstrate the subject's tension level. Fluctuations are monitored with the assistance of various apparatus including: inflatable
pressure cuffs on the upper arm gauging blood pressure; electrodes
affixed to the fingertips measuring skin resistance; a pneumograph
tube tightly encircling the chest observing respiration patterns; and
devices in the chair determining body movements. 30 Falsification of a
response to an inquiry evokes a psychological reaction which is observable in these physiological changes and charted by the polygraph unit.
The actual testing procedure exploits the heightened tension associated with the utterance of a falsehood. Initially, the subject might
be placed in a reception room with literature particularizing the
infallibility of the technique. 3' Thereafter, the examiner will interview the subject and at this time describe the testing procedure in

27

E.g., United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973

(1976); Corbett v. State, 94 Nev. 643, 646-47, 584 P.2d 704, 706-07 (1978): see infra notes 69-111
and accompanying text.
2s The polygraph is a relatively sophisticated device and is subject to variation with respect to
methods of administration and selection of instrumentation. An extensive discussion of all of
these variables is beyond the scope of this article. For a more detailed discussion of the polygraph
technique see J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 7; Abrams, supra note 2: Axelrod, The Use of Lie
Detectors by Criminal Defense Attorneys, 3 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 107, 109-36 (1977); Levitt,
supra note 13: Pemberton, supra note 2, at 49-57: Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific
Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694 (1961); see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLoGY ASSESSMENT,
REVIEW AND

U.S. CONGRESS,

EVALUATION-A

SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPH

TECHNICAL

MEMORANDUM,

TESTING: A RESEARCH

OTA-TM-Hl-15 (1983) [hereinafter

cited as OTA STUDY].
20 J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 7. at 5-6. For a discussion of the historical development
of
the polygraph see id. at 2-5; Abrams, supra note 2, at 85-88.
30 J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 7, at 5.
Si Pemberton, supra note 2, at 54. The reactions of the subject to the literature may aid the
examiner in forming an initial impression.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:285

detail. 32 The dependability of the machine is stressed in order to
discourage any attempts at subterfuge. Questions are formulated and
their format is explained. The latter course of action is intended to
33
avoid any discrepancies resulting from surprise or misconception.
Following the interview the apparatus are attached, and a series
of questions is asked. 34 The questions include neutral inquiries such as
"Are you male or female?" and control questions 35 such as "Have you
ever committed a crime?" The posing of the control questions normally produces uneasiness because of its mildly accusatory nature.
Monitoring the responses to the control questions establishes a baseline
level 36 which serves as a comparison point for the relevant inquiriesthe actual accusations of illegality. 37 In order to develop an adequate
contrast between the relevant and the control questions, the examiner
must stimulate emotion. The card test 38 or "stim test ' 39 is utilized for
this purpose. The subject is asked to select and remember a playing
card. A series of cards, including the correct one, is then shown
40
individually, and the subject is directed to deny the card's identity.
The anxiety produced by the forced deception will be detected by the
examiner, thus affirming the infallibility of the machine and heightening the subject's tension. Finally, the examiner takes a recess and
asks the subject whether any answer was untruthful. 4' Assuming some
32 J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 7, at 17. While the machine's accuracy must be asserted,
the examiner must be careful not to create the impression that the interview is an interrogation.
To do so would create confusion and undue emotion. The discussion may be interpreted as an
accusation of guilt, thus risking the development of unrelated tension.
31 Id. at 24-26. Test questions should be as clear and unambiguous as possible and the
examiner must take into consideration the educational background of the subject.
34 Id. at 25-32.
11 Reid and Inbau define a control question as one concerning "an act of wrongdoing of the
same general nature as the main incident under investigation, and one to which the subject, in
all probability, will lie or to which his answer will be of dubious validity in his own mind.'" Id. at
28 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
" Sometimes admissions of unrelated criminal activity develop and the control question must
be revised. For instance, if the subject admits to shoplifting as a child, the control inquiry is
reformed to, "Except for shoplifting, have you ever committed a crime?" By removal of the
unrelated admission, emotion associated with'it is eliminated, allowing for a firmer tension
baseline level. Id. at 29.
" See id. at 24-28.
Is Id. at 42-43.
3o Abrams, supra note 2, at 99.
" The same test can be administered by the use of numbers. Id. at 99-100. The subject will
choose a number between one and 10, for instance, and will be asked to respond in the negative
when asked if this was the number he chose. Id. at 100. The examiner will detect the false
response.
11 The examiner will look at the polygraphic readings in the presence of the subject before
inquiring as to falsehoods. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 7, at 43-44. This gives the impression
that an untruth has been discovered.
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minor detail has been detected, the subject is asked to clarify any
undisclosed inaccuracies. In the usual case this inquiry results in the
disclosure of some inconsequential element, but a more serious omission may necessitate reevaluation of baseline levels.
The foundation for testing is now established. Baseline emotion
levels are compared to levels on the relevant inquiry. Since the format, including the actual questions, has been fully explained, substantial increases in tension observed on the relevant inquiry are assumed
to be verifications of a falsehood, rather than aberrations resulting
from surprise or misconception. The effectiveness of the relevant inquiries is enhanced further when the examiner possesses confidential
information about the subject. As only a guilty subject would understand the significance of an inquiry concerning such information, a
supplemental verification of guilt is obtained if the polygraph registers
42
a peak of tension.
IV. THE POLYGRAPH'S LIMITATIONS
The estimated effectiveness of the polygraph varies. Horvath and
Reid rate success at 87.75 % ;43 Orne suggests eighty-five percent; 44 and
Lykken concludes only sixty-four to seventy-five percent. 45 The variance in the estimates may be a function of the competence of the
examiners, the personality differences in the subjects, or any one of a
multitude of variables associated with the testing process. An examiner must evaluate the changes in blood pressure, skin resistance,
respiration, and muscular movement. Regardless of the apparently
high efficiency rates for polygraph testing, these conclusions may be
faulty.

12 See id. at 55-59.
4' Horvath & Reid. The Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diaglnosis of Truth and Deception, 62 J. CmNi. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE Sc. 276, 278-79 (1971) in J. REID & F. INBAU,
supra note 7, at 391-92.
" United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 689-90 (D.D.C.) (quoting from transcripts of

Professor Martin T. Orne, who testified for government), rev'd per curiam, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
" Lykken, The Psychopath and the Lie Detector, 15 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOCY 137, 141 (Mar.,

1978). In a recently published study the Office of Technology Assessment reviewed prior studies
of the effectiveness of polygraph testing in specific-incident criminal investigations and concluded that it was impossible to determine a specific quantitative measure which accurately
would reflect the overall effectiveness of the procedure. OTA STUDY, supra note 28, at 97. The
study did conclude, however, that available research evidence did indicate that when the control
question technique, see text supra notes 34-41, is used in specific-incident investigations, significant error rates are associated with the procedure. OTA STUDY, supra note 28, at 79.
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The polygraph machine does not directly ascertain truth. Rather,
it detects emotional change in the subject. Any willful falsification
activates the sympathetic autonomic nervous system and this reaction
is made evident by the subject's tension. 46 The foreign nature of a lie,
although a relatively common event, is contrary to an individual's
mental well-being. Consequently, the mind reacts with emotion
which can be monitored by the polygraph. Unfortunately, the examiner never can be absolutely certain of the reason for the tension. It
may be the psychological response to a known falsehood, but it also
may come from another source. To illustrate, an individual wrongfully accused of a crime may be overly sensitive. The control question:
"Have you ever committed a crime?" may be answered honestly with
only modest increases in uneasiness; but the relevant question: "Did
you steal the ring?" measures a pronounced tension. The examiner
concludes guilt, but in reality, the observation may merely reflect
oversensitivity caused by a prior accusation. 47 Thus, enhanced emotion mistakenly may result in a challenge to the subject's veracity.
Other factors adversely affect the machine's accuracy. A subject
who is not concerned about being detected may not evince the requisite emotional tension and may therefore appear innocent. This may
occur when the subject has so rationalized the criminal event that selfdeception develops. There is no psychological reaction because the
mind does not recognize the lie. 48 In a similar fashion, the mentally

11See, e.g., United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 92 (E.D. Mich. 1972) ("A lie is an
emergency to the psychological well-being of a person and causes stress. Attempts to deceive
cause the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system to react and cause bodily changes
of such magnitude that they can be measured and interpreted.").
The autonomic nervous system contains the sympathetic and parasympathetic branches. The
first imposes involuntary reactions of fight or flight during an emergency situation. When a
person becomes angry or afraid, the sympathetic system invokes an increased heartrate, perspiration, increased respiration, and agitation. Contrastingly, the parasympathetic counters the
sympathetic by calming the involuntary reactions. It lowers heartrate, perspiration, respiration,
and agitation. For a general discussion of the autonomic nervous system see H. EYSENCK, CRIME
AND PERSONALITY 81-82 (1979).
47 See Use of Polygraphsas "Lie Detectors." by the Federal Government. Hearingsbefore the
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 368
(1964) (statement of Dr. John 1. Lacey) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. The report noted that
oversensitivity may produce excessive physiological reactions to any questions perceived as
relating to the subject's integrity. If a pretest interview is interpreted as an accusation of guilt,
physiological changes may simply reflect an oversensitivity to the allegation. J. REID & F. INBAU,
supra note 7, at 226. Further, anxiety over an unrelated personal matter may interfere with
polygraphic readings. Id. at 220.
45 Reid and Inbau cite as an example a criminal sentenced to death:
So engrossed does he become in his present predicament that his crime memories are
rendered somewhat obscure; and he may have so vehemently protested his innocence
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unbalanced person's reasoning may be so defective as to render any
reading unreliable. The sociopath, for instance, is frequently a compulsive liar. His misrepresentations often are undetectable because
falsifying has become an engrained portion of the personality. 4 Instead of resisting the falsehood, the mind adopts it.
The polygraph can recognize "lie" reports only in the form of
physiological changes, and its accuracy therefore is limited by the
dependability of the assumptions associated with the detection of
these changes. Subjects who do not conform to the general pattern
may be incorrectly branded guilty or mistakenly exonerated. Depressant drugs, for example, may lower anxiety and correspondingly reduce physiological responses. 50 In such a case the examiner mistakenly
may accept innocence when the subject's false answers are concealed
by the drugs. In other instances, through training, the subject successfully can control emotional disruptions. Since deception is measured
by abnormally large anxiety gaps between the control and relevant
responses, the subject's intentional control of emotion and the resulting rise in the control level will cause the relevant response to appear
to be within comparable limits. Muscular activity, especially in the
arm or leg, could also develop such a false reading by restricting blood
and consequently increasing blood pressure. 5' When heightened emotional levels emerge from the control question, anxiety from the relevant inquiry may appear roughly equivalent, implying innocence. By

• . . [that he was] convinced in his own mind that he was innocent. Were a person in
such a state of mind given a Polygraph examination, he might not give any specific
deception responses.
J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 7, at 227-28.
" A sociopath is a person who experiences substantial social maladjustment while possessing
normal intelligence and an absence of any brain disease which is apparent without sophisticated
machinery. C. JEFFREY, BIOLOGY AND CRIME 66 (1979). The personality is characterized by a lack
of guilt, inability to learn from experience, incapacity for loving relations, impulsiveness, and
antisocial conduct. Id. Diagnosing this abnormality is not an easy task since there is generally no
pain, anguish, or communication difficult., The individual may be superficially charming with
the major symptom being a past history of unreasonable behavior. S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND
THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 101-02 (1971). Obviously, a polygraph operator with limited experience
may be unable to render a correct judgment of this psychological state. Since the subject lacks the
capacity to feel guilt, lies can be expressed without remorse or hesitation and thus without any
observable physiological response. Reid and Inbau discuss the difficulties in testing mentally
defective individuals. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 7, at 250-51; see also Levitt, supra note 13,
at 451-52.
'o J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 7, at 244. Reid and Inbau suggest, however, that subjects
who consume sedatives prior to testing exhibit physical characteristics, including drowsiness and
mental sluggishness, which are readily discernible to a trained examiner. Id, at 236, 244; see
generally A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 320-21 (2d cd.
1978) (describing symptoms of barbiturate abuse).
51 J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 7, at 258.
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contrast, artificially lowering the relevant response anxiety level will
disrupt the formation of clear anxiety gaps, and thus indicate truthfulness. This may be accomplished through psychological evasion where
subjects intentionally distract themselves, thereby moderating the
polygraph readings. 52 To illustrate, when a relevant question is asked,
the subject will focus on an irrelevant matter so as to block physiological responses. 53 Through this method, the polygraph reports restrained emotion erroneously depicting innocence.
Obviously, the subject provides a constant threat of sabotage
which must be frustrated by the examiner. Often, however, the exam54
iner lacks sufficient training to discharge this function successfully.
Some operators have a police background, accompanied by limited
coursework or internships. 5 This experience may be of valuable service in rendering many polygraph decisions but it is inadequate when
the test is administered to the drug user or the mentally unbalanced
individual. Subtle psychological judgments may be necessary to identify these abnormalities. 56 Unfortunately, too few examiners are
equipped to make such judgments. By merely studying the machine's
charts without an evaluation of the underlying psychological factors
the examiner always risks a false declaration of innocence.
Although the rarity of confronting mentally abnormal subjects
and the existence of discernible manifestations usually associated with
drug use may justify the risk of error with underqualified examiners,
there still exists the inherent and more prejudicial factor of subjective
bias. Examiners are encouraged to render a tentative judgment of
guilt at the pretest stage. Hesitations in the subject's response pattern, 57 tendencies to justify criminal activity, 5 nervousness, 59 and
uncertainty with respect to test outcome" all may be viewed negatively by the tester. This subjective determination of guilt or innocence endangers the entire process. Framing the relevant inquiries
may be less poignant when the examiner perceives the subject as

at 210-14.
5' Id. at 210-11.
s Skolnick, supra note 28, at 707.
52 See id.

5' Id.; see infra notes 155-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the qualifications that
some states require of polygraph examiners.
'" Skolnick, supra note 28, at 707 (comparing educational background of polygraph technician with that of psychiatrist and questioning examiner's ability to make necessary psychological
judgments associated with polygraph testing).
11 J. REri & F. INBAU, supra note 7, at 18-19.
51 Id. at 19.
-1 Id. at 20.
0

Id.
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truthful, thereby allowing the subject intentionally to evade the true
import of the question and, consequently, appear to respond honestly.
Conversely, if the examiner perceives guilt, this may be the precursor
of a relevant inquiry which is unintentionally accusatory. Intonations
in delivery or the use of inflammatory language may enhance emotion
in the subject. Since the examiner's actions are unwittingly performed, controlling bias is a formidable task. Described as the "halo"
effect, 6 1 this bias relates to the tendency to err in favor of preconceived
notions.6 2 The problem is not limited to the questioning stage; it also
has significant implications in the interpretation of polygraph read63
ings, an equally complex, subjective procedure.
Subjectivity and inadequate educational requirements have the
potential to influence adversely an examiner's conclusions and have
lead Professor Inbau to conclude that only twenty percent of examiners are fully qualified.6 4 Facing criticism, some jurisdictions have
attempted to rectify this by monitoring the integrity and educational
background of examiners.6 5 Legislation is deficient, however, when it

8' Skolnick, supra note 28, at 713 (citing Thorndike, A Constant Error in Psychological
Ratings, 4 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOCY 25 (1920) as the originator of this term).
62 Skolnick cites as an example of this phenomenon the teacher who is more likely to give a
better grade to a student with a "bright" reputation versus one perceived as "dull." Id.
The subjectivity inherent in the interpretation of polygraph records is clearly demonstrated by the following list of questions Reid and Inbau suggest the examiner should ask himself
in interpreting the polygraph records:
1. What is the subject's normal breathing pattern?
2. Was the subject cooperating fully during the test?
3. What question shows the greatest response in respiration?
4. What question shows the greatest response in blood pressure?
5. Does the subject show any response on the control questions? If not, are different control
questions needed?
6. How do the subject's responses compare with his control question responses?
7. Which responses are greater and more consistent, the crucial questions or the control
questions?
8. If the subject overresponded, is a guilt complex test advisable?
9. If the responses are not sufficiently clear as to either truth or deception, is a reexamination
necessary?
10. Did the subject purposely try to overrespond or indulge in gross movements when his
chosen card is called, or when he answered "yes" as so instructed on the "yes" test?
J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 7, at 61 (emphasis in original); see also Abbell, supra note 2, at
40-41 (nature of information available to examiner, sources of information, and examiner's
observations of subject's behavior all affect interpretation of charts); Horvath & Reid, supra note
43, at 279 (polygraph examiners' diagnoses based solely on polygraph records revealed that
examiners erred at rates of approximately nine to 20% depending upon experience).
I" Hearings, supra note 47, at 8 (statement of Fred E. Inbau, Professor of Law, Northwest-

ern University School of Law).
65

See infra notes 155-66 and accompanying text.
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fails specifically to mandate a process for psychological evaluation. 6
Preliminary assessments of veracity and mental stability, detection of
evasion techniques and drug use, and the framing of effective test
questions all are linked to psychological theory. 67 Only an examiner
with at least some psychological training can perform these functions
adequately.68
V. QUESTIONING THE STIPULATION PROCESS

Judicial skepticism of the polygraph's probative value generally
results in a finding of inadmissibility.6 9 Yet when the parties stipulate
to the admissibility of polygraph results, the judiciary often acquiesces70 despite lingering doubts about the reliability of the instrument.
Courts thus create the paradox of admitting results in the face of
persistent fears of error or deception.
There are, inter alia, three significant factors associated with
polygraph evidence which must be considered in making a determination of admissibility: 1) the reliability of the procedure; 2) the qualifications of the examiner; and 3) the conclusions drawn from the examination.7 1 When the parties stipulate to the admissibility of polygraph
evidence, the first two of these factors rarely are subject to challenge
at trial because the parties have agreed to accept any errors associated
with them.72 Unfortunately, some courts disallow further challenges
" See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
67 Abrams has described the polygraph procedure as "primarily a psychological approach"

and has suggested that this is especially true during the pre-test interview which requires the
examiner to convince the subject of the effectiveness of the technique, to observe his physical and
mental state, and to review the personal history of the subject with an eye toward developing
effective test questions. Abrams, supra note 2, at 99-100.
68 One authority in the field of polygraph science has suggested that all examiners have either
a bachelor's or master's degree in psychology. Hearings, supra note 47, at 393 (testimony of Dr.
Joseph F. Kubis, Professor of Psychology, Fordham University).
6" See supra note 3.
70 See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
973 (1976); Herman v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 33, 40 (C.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd, 396
F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1968); People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 318-19, 235 N.W.2d 581, 587
(1975); State v. Descoteaux, 94 Wash. 2d 31, 614 P.2d 179, 183 (1980); see also Israel v.
McMorris, 643 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 967, 970 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (noting that 23 states currently admit polygraph stipulations).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 736-38 (8th Cir. 1975) (stipulated
polygraph testimony admissible where sufficient showing of reliability of procedure, expertise of
examiner, and utilization of proper examination techniques), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976),
72 See, e.g., State v. Bennett, 17 Or. App. 197, 200-01, 521 P.2d 31, 33 (1974) (declining to
consider question of admissibility since challenged testimony was introduced pursuant to written
stipulation). But see State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 283, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962) (trial judge has
discretion to refuse to admit stipulated test results if not convinced of examiners' qualifications or
propriety of test conditions); accord Corbett v. State, 94 Nev. 643, 646-47, 584 P.2d 704, 707
(1978).
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to unfavorable polygraph results.73 This is unwise. The purpose of a
stipulation should be to overcome evidentiary prohibitions, not to
introduce faulty testimony. As stipulation usually occurs prior to testing, when neither side knows the outcome, parties are able to evaluate
only the polygraph procedure and the examiner's qualifications. They
cannot be certain that the examiner will analyze the formulated data
correctly.
Thus, the stipulation should be construed to apply only to the
polygraph procedures and the examiner's qualifications, not to the
conclusions drawn from testing. In order to remedy this problem,
scientific conclusions must be questioned. This may be accomplished
by cross-examining the expert who administered the test,'7 by subjecting the test results to the discretion of the trial judge, 75 and, in certain
cases, by using another polygraph examiner to challenge application
of the procedure. It also might be advisable to conduct a separate
examination. 76 Regardless of the remedy selected, the examiner's interpretation of polygraph data and the conclusions drawn therefrom
must be closely scrutinized when stipulation is the basis for admissibility.
Stipulation to the admission of evidence can be predicated on two
legal theories: contract and waiver. Contractual analysis is not unprecedented in criminal law, and agreements between prosecutors
and defendants are certainly commonplace. For example, a guilty
plea may be entered to reduce a charge or in exchange for a recommendation of a light sentence. 77 In Santobello v. New York, 78 the

E.g., State v. Bennett, 17 Or. App. 197, 200-01, 521 P.2d 31. 33 (1974).
See State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 283, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962): Comment, The Admissibility o] Polygraph ("Lie Detector") Evidence Pursuant to Stipulation in CriminalProceedings, 5
AKRON L. REV. 235 (1972). The polygraph testing procedure has been divided into four portions:
data collection, pre-test interview, testing, and post-test interview. Abrams, supra note 2, at 104.
Preparation for cross-examination should focus on each phase, including formulation of questions used during the examination and the presence of voice intonations. In probing the examiner's conclusions, relevant considerations include precisely what factors in the subject's answers
or demeanor were considered and to what extent these factors would have to have differed to
warrant a different final opinion on Veracity.
75 E.g., State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 283, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962).
76 Since the second examination most likely would be without stipulation, it would be
necessary to prove the qualifications of the examiner. Even though the procedure was not
stipulated, one could argue that since equipment identical to the first test was employed, the
results should be admitted provided the examiner is qualified and the test is administered
properly.
77 See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971): Geisser v. United States, 513 F.2d
862, 870-71 (5th Cir. 1975); Williams v. State, 341 So. 2d 214, 215-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
78 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
71

71
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defendant pleaded guilty after agreeing with one prosecutor that no
recommendation as to sentence would be made. 79 This agreement was
not honored.8 0 The United States Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction and found that "when a plea rests in any significant
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be
said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must
be fulfilled."'8
The contract analysis used in Santobello also has been applied
2
where immunity was promised in return for providing information
or actual testimony. 3 Negotiated pleas and immunity grants are both
very common and, arguably, are indispensable to the orderly functioning of the criminal justice system.8 4 Each of these examples illustrates the application of a contract in criminal law: The prosecutor
and the defendant reach an agreement with benefits and burdens for
each party.
Contractual analysis likewise is applicable to a stipulation for
introduction of polygraph readings into evidence. 8 5 Stipulation generally involves a simple agreement by the parties to allow the use of the
test results prior to knowing the outcome. In Corbett v. State,8 6 both
sides stipulated to a polygraph examination and to the admissibility of
the results. When the outcome proved unfavorable to the defendant,
he objected to admission of the evidence at trial.8 7 Applying reasoning

70 Id. at 258.
10 Id. at 259.
IId. at 262 (emphasis added); see Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remediesfor
Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 512-14 (1978) (suggesting Santobello offers
defendants constitutional right to relief for broken plea bargains).
82 See, e.g., State v. Hanson, 249 Ga. 739, 744-45, 295 S.E.2d 297, 299 (1982).
83 See, e.g., Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585, 591-92, 550 S.W.2d 432, 436-39 (1977); State
v. Tanner, 425 So. 2d 760, 763-64 (La. 1983).
14 See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260 ("[t]he disposition of criminal charges by ...
plea
bargaining', is an essential component of the administration of justice").
11 In a typical case the parties agree that criminal charges will be dismissed if the examination indicates innocence, but if the results are unfavorable to the defendant the evidence will be
admissible at trial. See, e.g., Workman v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 206 (Ky. 1979); People
v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 309-10, 235 N.W.2d 581, 582-83 (1975). In some cases the defendant
has agreed to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser charge if the results are unfavorable. State v. Davis,
188 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
In instances where required court approval was not obtained, some courts have refused to
enforce these agreements. State v. Sanchell, 191 Neb. 505, 510, 216 N.W.2d 504, 508 (1974); see
also infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
88 94 Nev. 643, 584 P.2d 704 (1978).
87 Id.
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similar to that in Santobello, but here applied against the defendant,
the Nevada Supreme Court refused to void the bargain8 8 and allowed
the stipulated polygraph evidence based on contract theory.8"
Alternatively, polygraph evidence is justified by the doctrine of
waiver where, despite the undependable characteristics attributable
to the machine, the parties previously have relinquished their objections. 90 Waiver operates to foreclose available relief irrespective of any
entitlement: Once an individual acts to forego, the right is nullified. 9 '
Although it frequently arises out of an agreement, waiver, unlike
contract, also may develop unilaterally. With polygraph stipulations,
the failure to object will preclude complaints concerning the admissibility of the evidence. Consequently, the contract and waiver approaches to stipulation are functionally equivalent.
Neither of the supporting theories considers the reliability of the
procedure. For instance, in State v. Davis92 the court sustained an
agreement whereby the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the case if the
polygraph indicated innocence, and the defendant agreed to plead to
manslaughter if the results indicated he was not telling the truth.
After the examination vindicated the defendant, the prosecutor
appeals court, highlighting the
elected to proceed. 93 The Florida
"pledge of the public faith,"' 94 found the agreement binding as "a
promise made by state officials-and one that should not be lightly

81 Id. at 646-47, 584 P.2d at 706-07.

19 Id. The court distinguished its holding from cases in which the parties do not stipulate. Id.
It noted that principles of fairness and judicial efficiency were significant policy considerations
"militat[ing] against a general rule admitting results of polygraph tests" when the parties do not
concur, but that these principles were simply not compelling when the parties agree to the
conditions of testing prior to the polygraph examination. Id. at 646, 584 P.2d at 706.
An additional factor in the court's finding was that the prerequisites to admissibility of
polygraph testing as set out in State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 283-84, 371 P.2d 894, 900-01 (1962),
were satisfied in this case. Corbett, 94 Nev. at 647, 584 P.2d at 705: see infra notes 104-05, 14851 and accompanying text for discussion of Valdez.
50 E.g., State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 246, 307 N.W.2d 628, 637 (1981) (stipulation
operates as waiver of objection or challenge to validity of basic theory of polygraph): see State v,
Mick, 546 S.W.2d 508, 509 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (as defendant voluntarily opened up subject of
polygraph examination on redirect she waived objection to state's development of matter on
recross).
" See Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 478, 483 (1981)
("[t]he most general definition of waiver . . . is a decision not to exercise a right, or, more
precisely, a judicial finding that a person has lost a right as a result of his decision").
92 188 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
13 Id. at 26. The polygraph examiner agreed upon by the parties concluded innocence
although later he accepted another operator's contrary opinion in lieu of his own. Id.
94 Id. at 27 (citing State v. Ashby, 43 N.J. Super. 350, 195 A.2d 635 (1963), rev'd, 43 N.J.
273, 204 A.2d 1 (1964)).
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disregarded."' 5 Rather than evaluating the propriety of the bargain,
the court focused on the integrity of the bargaining process.96 A better
approach when faced with an unduly, exploitative agreement would
be to allow accrual of benefits to a defendant who relies on the
bargain and to preclude enforceability of detriments as contrary to
public policy.9 7 This would ensure the integrity of the process while
deterring prosecutorial abuse.
The need for caution when enforcing agreements for the admissibility of evidence is particularly acute when the evidence to be admitted is the result of a polygraph test. Oversensitivity from prior accusations98 and heightened anxiety because of the examination's
importance may result in pronounced tension. In light of these sources
of inaccuracy, it is inadvisable and abusive to the process to accept a
conviction based on a "truth telling" machine. Moreover, even if the
polygraph happens to be correct in an individual case, it is a poor
substitute for a trial. As long as courts consider it unreliable, respectability should not be gained simply because the test may function to
determine the ultimate jury question. In fact, concern about excessive
jury consideration of polygraph results has caused the judiciary to be
particularly reluctant to admit this evidence. 99 This skepticism is not
unwarranted. A recent study, for instance, indicates that "unfavorable polygraph evidence may be a deciding factor in . . .an ambiguous case." 100 The erroneously perceived infallibility of the technique

11Id. The propriety of negotiating a plea based on the opinion of the examiner, rather than
directly on guilt, was never evaluated. Consequently, the agreement was upheld because of the
promise. The court did not concern itself with the reliability of the procedure.
96 Id.
97 The

courts steadfastly have refused to be used as instruments against the public good. See,
e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13-20 (1947) (refusing to enforce discriminatory covenants); In re Andrews Estate, 151 Misc. 361, 365, 272 N.Y.S. 847, 850 (1934) (ruling decedent's
will so unfair as against public policy).
9 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Bursten, 560 F.2d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975); State v. Biddle, 599 S.W.2d 182, 191 (Mo. 1980).
In Biddle, the Missouri Supreme Court held polygraph evidence inadmissible based, inter alia,
on its potential to mislead and displace the jury's fact finding function. Id. at 191. The court
specifically noted the jury's function in determining truthfulness, and concluded: "There is no
place in our jury system for a machine or an expert to tell the jury who is lying and who is not."
Id. But see Note, Stipulation Cannot Make Polygraph Results Admissible, 47 Mo. L. REv. 586,
597 (1982) (suggesting that, as with other evidence, polygraph results will merely aid jury in
their conclusions; restrictive approach taken by Biddle unwarranted).
'00Markwart & Lynch, The Effect of Polygraph Evidence on Mock Jury Decision-Making, 7
J. POLICE Sci. ADmIN. 324, 331 (1979). In one study jurors who served in a case in which
polygraph evidence was admitted were polled. The study revealed that five of the 10 jurors
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may functionally abrogate some jurors' independence, and although
all testimony may have this potential, it is especially troublesome
when the evidence lacks a legally sufficient basis for admission.
An additional concern exists in jurisdictions which do not mandate even a minimum licensing requirement for the polygraph operator. 10 1Any beneficial aspects of the testing are diluted by the probability of deficient training,'0 2 as some courts have recognized.' 0 3 For
instance, in State v. Valdez,' 04 although the concept of stipulation was
approved in principle, the court qualified its holding by requiring,
inter alia, the following: 1) vesting discretion in the trial judge to
refuse to admit the results of the polygraph test if he is not convinced
of the examiner's qualifications or the propriety of the conditions
under which the test was conducted; and 2) giving the opposing party
the opportunity to cross-examine the operator with respect to his
qualifications and training, the test conditions, the limitations and
possibilities for error, and any other matter deemed pertinent by the
trial judge. 05
Other decisions also have viewed critically the experience of the
examiner, but in so doing necessarily have adopted the concept of

polled were so impressed by the scientific Value of the polygraph that they accepted the truth of
the testimony without question. Forkosch, The Lie Detector and the Courts. 16 N.Y.U. L.Q.
REV. 202, 228-31 (1938-1939). But see Peters, A Survey of Polygraph Evidence in Criminal
Trials, 68 A.B.A. J. 162, 164 (1982) where 19 lawyers who had utilized polygraph evidence at
trial were surveyed. The following responses were recorded: none felt that polygraph testimony
disrupted the trial; onlv two thought that polygraph testimony was unreasonable and unintelligible; and only four believed the judge or jury disregarded significant evidence because of
polygraph testimony. Id. This survey is questionable, however, because of the unavailability of
statistical controls including the absence of randomness, inadequate sample size, and subjective
bias on the part of respondents.
101 For example, even though Massachusetts trial courts have been cautioned to verify the
expertise of polygraph examiners, there is no state licensing statute setting minimum qualifications. Commonwealth v. Vitello, 381 N.E.2d 582, 588 (1978); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile,
365 Mass. 421, 429-30, 313 N.E.2d 120, 126 (1974).
'01 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
03 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 512 (D. Md. 1973) ("divergent
reactions of the leading [polygraph] practitioners hardly inspires confidence in the reliability of
the opinions of less distinguished practitioners").
10491 Ariz. 274, 283, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962).
'05 Id. The court also required: 1) that the prosecutor, the defendant, and his counsel all sign a
written stipulation providing for submission to the test and ultimate admissibility of the test
results and the examiner's opinion and 2) that the trial judge instruct the jury that the examiner's
testimony is only to serve as corroborative evidence and not to prove or disprove the case. Id. at
283-84, 371 P.2d at 900-01; see inJra notes 150-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
necessity for proper jury instruction.
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stipulated polygraph reports. 10 6 In United States v. Oliver, 07 for example, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized "that
the reliability of a polygraph test depends primarily on the expertise of
the examiner and upon his technique."'' 0 8 Noting, however, that the
trial court found the examiner highly qualified in his field, the court
affirmed the lower court's admission of the stipulated results. 10 9 The
major problem associated with admitting polygraph evidence under
these circumstances is apparent: Physiological responses must be interpreted and, regardless of the examiner's qualifications, the test reflects
the examiner's subjectivity and lack of experience, or, in many cases,
the subject's unrelated tension.
Stipulations may save time and energy by narrowing the issues,
but efficiency should not be furthered at the expense of accuracy. The
approach of the Valdez court indicates a sensitivity to the need for
safeguards in jurisdictions where stipulations are allowed. Parties
should be permitted and encouraged to disclose any limitations of the
testing process. Decisions which ignore this information exclude from
the jury facts which are necessary for a complete understanding of the
polygraph and which, ultimately, may alter the verdict. If courts are
justly to admit polygraph evidence on the basis of a stipulation, they
must embrace accuracy.
Approval of a voluntary stipulation is simply too convenient.
Undoubtedly, the evidence will render final determination of the
action more probable," 0 but not necessarily more accurate. When a
subject succeeds in deceiving an examiner, the prosecution's case is
unjustifiably injured by increasing the probability of the guilty going
unpunished. Even when the results support the prosecution, there is
no assurance of accuracy. Moreover, the picture of desperate people
consenting to a questionable technique in the hope of buttressing their
cases should haunt our social consciences. A stipulation obtained under that circumstance improperly exploits anxieties. As previously
suggested, the fact that the subject is experiencing heightened tension
because of the importance of the testing will increase erroneous conclusions. 1 1' An advisable approach, therefore, would be to substan-

106 E.g., United States v. Oliver, 524 F.2d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 424 U.S. 973

(1976).
107 Id.
10 Id. at 737.
100 Id.
110 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
I See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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tially limit the use of the polygraph. Stated simply, the polygraph is
unacceptably inaccurate. Its respectability should not be obtained by
stipulation.
VI.

FiFTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS

The fifth amendment provides a criminal defendant with a privilege against compelled testimony. 1 2 As evidentiary stipulations are
based on consent, they by definition invoke the self-incrimination
doctrine. As with other constitutional protections," 3 an individual's
protection against self-incrimination may be waived "provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently."" ' 4 When
these principles are viewed in light of the instant problem two issues
arise: first, whether the fifth amendment is applicable to polygraph
testimony; and second, if so, whether it is possible to ever knowingly
waive the privilege.
Traditionally, the fifth amendment has been applied to testimonial rather than physical evidence. " 5 Identification procedures such as
voice exemplars"" and clothes modeling" 7 do not involve any communicative act by the defendant and thus are not rendered inadmissible
on privilege grounds. Additionally, seizure of tax records" 8 and blood
samples,"19 although potentially damaging, have been held nontestimonial. Consequently, such evidence is admissible despite the privilege. Nevertheless, dicta in Schmerber v. California120 specifically
distinguished polygraph evidence from these other forms of purely
physical evidence:

112U.S. CONST. amend. V provides that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
113 E.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (right to counsel during interrogation).
" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
115 E.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757

(1966).
"I United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.

218, 222-23 (1967) (no error in compelling defendant to utter in lineup words allegedly spoken
during commission of crime).
17
18

Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910).
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-29 (1973) (seized records previously placed with

accountant are not compulsion against defendant because information was not being extorted

from accused himself). But see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (person in
possession of incriminating written statements may assert privilege).
"I Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
12 Id.
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Some tests seemingly directed to obtain 'physical evidence', for
example, lie detector tests measuring changes in body function
during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial. To compel a person to
submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his
guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether
willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.' 2'
The polygraph obviously employs physical measurements; however, these measurements are better understood as manifestations of
psychological reactions. The machine tests the subject's reactions to
provocative questions. Unlike voice exemplars, where the purpose is
identification, a polygraph ostensibly measures the truthfulness of
statements. As the United States Supreme Court suggested in Schmerber, psychological responses are utilized communicatively as testimony of truth rather than merely as physical evidence. In Miranda v.
Arizona, 1 22 oral admissions were elicited from an accused during an
incommunicado interrogation. By recognizing such procedures as
"psychologically rather than physically oriented,"'' 23 the court introduced psychological sensitivity to the invocation of the fifth amendment. It found custodial interrogation inherently coercive and, accordingly, required that there be adequate warnings before a waiver
24
is permitted. 1
The polygraph also employs psychological influence. It exploits
tension surrounding falsehoods by emphasizing the infallibility of the
technique. 25 Baseline levels of anxiety are obtained after the card test
stimulates emotion, and confrontation on minor inaccuracies solidifies
the subject's belief in the machine's invincibility.126 Miranda highlighted the psychological advantage derived when the defendant is
deprived of outside contact. 27 The polygraph subject is clearly so

121

Id. at 764.

122 384 U.S.
123
124

436, 439 (1966).
Id. at 448.
Id. at 478-79.

See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
127 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-55. The Court presented a variety of coercive interrogative
techniques and described the essence of the practice as follows: "To be alone with the subject is
essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist." Id. at 455.
12-

126
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deprived, being placed in isolation with the examiner and effectively
denied any opportunity for contrary information. When the subject is
physically removed from supporters, the psychological coercion is
even more potent. Consequently, in order to obtain a valid fifth
amendment waiver from criminal suspects who are to be subjected to
28
polygraph testing, Miranda warnings are necessary. 1
The requirement for Miranda warnings prior to the administration of a polygraph test raises a complex issue. Proper operation of the
examination is dependent upon the subject's belief that the machine
never errs. The examiner is responsible for creating this impression. 129
As a consequence, waivers often are obtained without the defendant
having been advised of the polygraph's numerous limitations. 30
Miranda, however, provided that "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination. . . . ",'3 The
requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver would appear to
demand that the defendant be informed of the machine's inaccuracies
and the potential for sabotage. This may have a significant impact on
the accuracy of the test since the subject's candidness or confidence in
the technique will be affected. Yet failure to disclose this fundamental
information may render any stipulation ineffective because the defendant did not have full knowledge of the subject matter of the

"I One author has suggested that hope of obtaining a confession is a major factor in police
investigators' utilization of the polygraph: -For many polygraphers, the post test interrogation
and the confession it so often induces is the real object of the whole exercise. A lie test diagnosis is
a promissory note, not negotiable in many places, while a confession is pure gold, admissible in
court, the finish to a criminal investigation
D. LYKKEN, A TREMOR IN THE BLOOD: USES
AND ABUSES OF THE LIE DETECTOR 207 (1981). It is estimated that polygraph testing results in a
confession in one-quarter to one-half of the examinations. Id. at 208.
129 See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
130 See, e.g., People v. Schiers, 160 Cal. 2d 364, 329 P.2d 1 (1958) (per curiam). In Schiers,
Judge Carter, dissenting from the denial of petition for a hearing by the California Supreme
Court, detailed an example where psychological forces associated with the technique convinced
a defendant of the polygraph's infallibility:
When we first asked him to take the test, he was agreeable to take it. So Lietenant
[sic] Putty explained the test to him and asked him to pick out a card with a number
on it, and when he was asked what the number was, he was to lie about it and the
machine indicated he was lying.
So Mr. Schiersfelt that the test was a fair one and agreed to take it. We told him
that the test indicated that he was lying, and he said that he couldn't understand it,
even though he believed it was accurate when they showed him the experiment. He
couldn't understand why it indicated that.he was lying when they asked the questions about the murder of his wife.
Id. at 379, 329 P.2d at 1 (Carter, J., dissenting).
131 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
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waiver. Stipulating into evidence the results of an imperfect test requires knowledge of the extent of its imperfections. Moreover, coercing the accused into accepting the premise of the machine's infallibility by the utilization of psychological tactics is deceptive. 132 Since the
fifth amendment cannot be waived except in a knowing and intelligent manner, admission by stipulation of polygraph evidence is questionable.
VII.

THE RIGHT TO A POLYGRAPH

In recent years, a new polygraph controversy has evolved.
Despite the machine's deficiencies, some defendants assert a right to
present polygraph evidence over prosecutors' objections. 33 In Chambers v. Mississippi 34 and Washington v. Texas, 135 the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged that the sixth amendment right to
compulsory process' 36 prohibits a trial court from arbitrarily applying
state evidentiary rules to preclude a defendant from introducing ex37
culpatory evidence necessary to his defense.

132

See People v. Schiers, 160 Cal. 2d 364, 384, 329 P.2d 1, 4 (1958) (Carter, J., dissenting)

("An innocent man, convinced of the device's accuracy, would anticipate a favorable result, not
an involuntary admission of guilt. He cannot be held to have waived his privilege against an
untruth.").
133See Jones v. Weldon, 690 F.2d 836, 838 (lth Cir. 1982) (per curiam): United States v.
Black, 684 F.2d 481, 482 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 463 (1982); Milano v. Garrison, 677
F.2d 374, 375 (4th Cir. 1981); MeMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 459 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 967 (1982).
134 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
388 U.S. 14 (1967).
136 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right applies to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19.
117In Chambers, the defendant, as one of his defenses, sought to offer witnesses who would
have testified that someone other than the defendants had admitted to committing the murder
for which the defendant had been indicted. Chambers. 410 U.S. at 289. The trial court refused
to admit the testimony because it did not adhere to the Mississippi hearsay exception which was
limited to declarations against pecuniary interest. Id. at 299. Chambers was convicted of murder
and sentenced to life imprisonment; the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 284. Chambers argued before the United States Supreme Court that the application of the evidentiary rule
rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and deprived him of due process of law. Id. at 289-90.
The Court noted that the rationale for the exclusion of statements against penal interest was
premised on the potential for presentation of perjured testimony. Id. at 299. The Court found,
however, that the testimony rejected by the trial court "bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness" thus rendering a finding of inadmissibility of such evidence inconsistent with the general
rationale for excluding declarations against penal interest. Id. at 302. Additionally, the Court
took note of the critical nature of the testimony to Chambers' defense and concluded that "[i]n
these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are
implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice."
Id.; see also Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curiam) (second trial in which capital
punishment was imposed defendant was denied fair trial when Georgia hearsay rule was applied

1984]

POLYGRAPH STIPULATIONS

In McMorris v. Israel 38 an accused, armed with the precedents
of Chambers and Washington, successfully argued that his right to
compulsory process was violated when the prosecutor refused to stipulate to polygraph evidence and gave no reasons for the refusal.1 39 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit directed that a
writ of habeas corpus issue unless the prosecutor could demonstrate
"reasons which go to the reliability of the test or to the integrity of the
trial process, not reasons which consider merely the relative tactical
advantages from the use of the evidence to the prosecution and the
the
defense.' 40 Accordingly, the court remanded the case to assess
41
stipulation.
the
into
enter
to
refusing
for
prosecutor's reasons
Although the McMorris court held that a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial may be infringed by a prosecutor's arbitrary
refusal to stipulate to the admissibility of polygraph evidence, 42 other
circuits have rejected this approach. 43 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist
criticized the McMorris144 rationale, correctly recognizing that although Supreme Court precedent may prohibit the arbitrary exclusion
of exculpatory evidence, it does "not suggest any limitation upon the

to render inadmissible critical and reliable testimony); see generally Westen, Confrontation and
Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases. 91 HARV. L. REV. 567
(1978) (general discussion of sixth amendment right to compulsory process with analysis of
Chambers and Washington decisions).
In Washington, a Texas trial court, relying on two state statutes which provided that
persons charged or convicted as co-participants were incompetent to testify for one another,
sustained the prosecution's objection to the admissibility of the testimony of the defendant's
accomplice. Washington. 388 U.S. at 16. The defendant was convicted of murder. The United
States Supreme Court took note that the statutes at issue did not prohibit the co-participant from
testifying for the state. Id. at 16-17. Finding that the statutes effectively left the accomplice free
to lie for the state, but not on behalf of the defendant, the court found that the state arbitrarily
denied theo defendant "his right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
Id. at 23.
138 643 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied. 455 U.S. 967 (1982).
S"' Id. at 466.
14o Id. at 464.
141 Id.
141 Id. at 466.
'43 See Jones v. Weldon, 690 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Milano v. Garrison,
677 F.2d 374, 375 (4th Cir. 1981); Conner v. Auger, 595 F.2d 407, 411 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 851 (1979); see also Israel v. McMorris, 455 U.S. 967, 971 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting to denial of certiorari).
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit subsequently limited its holding in McMorris. United States v.
Black, 684 F.2d 481, 483-84 (7th Cir.) (McMorris "was merely our response to [a state's]
experiment with polygraph evidence", federal system has no standards for admissibility of
polygraph evidence and thus is not bound to comply with requirements of due process in
admitting or excluding such evidence), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 463 (1982).
141 Israel v. McMorris, 455 U.S. 967, 969-71 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting to denial of
certiorari).
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reasons that may permissibly motivate the prosecutor's objection to
the admission of inadmissible evidence.' 145 Nevertheless, Chambers
and Washington imply that at least under certain circumstances, 46 a
defendant has a right to have exculpatory evidence admitted.
Unwilling to recognize this right, the states cannot be accused of
acting in a whimsical or arbitrary manner. The inherent potential for
examiners to exercise subjective bias in administering the examination, the lack or inadequacy of educational requirements for examiners, and the possibility of incorrect interpretations of physiological
responses are at the core of their skepticism. Moreover, the defendant's willingness to take risks does not render the results stable. Chambers and Washington are founded upon the reliability of the evidence.
In Chambers, for example, the exculpatory evidence unconstitutionally held inadmissible was described as testimony which "bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness." 47 As has been argued throughout this article, polygraph testimony lacks such assurances of
reliability. Consequently, this line of decisions should have no precedential value for a constitutional right to the admissibility of polygraph evidence.
VIII.

NEEDED LEGISLATIVE ACTION

The reliability of the polygraph is questionable. If polygraph
results are admitted into evidence, juries may be unduly influenced,
and the perceived infallibility of the test may become the determining
factor in their ultimate decision. If courts are to continue to authorize
stipulated polygraphic results, certain legislative safeguards are
needed.
Valdez imposed a duty on the trial judge to be convinced not only
of the examiner's qualifications, but to allow for cross-examination,

141 Id.

at 969 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari).
In Chambers the Court expressly limited its holding:
In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor
does our holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to the
States in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and
proceduies. Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of
this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial.
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
147 Id. (emphasis added); see Washington, 388 U.S. at 23 (defendant's witness "was physically
and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and his testimony
would have been relevant and material to the defense" (footnotes omitted)); see also Green v.
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curiam).
'41

1984]

POLYGRAPH STIPULATIONS

309

and more importantly, to instruct the jury that the results do not
establish or disprove commission of a crime but only act in a corroborative fashion. 148 This decision signaled a refusal by the courts to
accept agreements by the parties without critical examination. The
Valdez precedent for judicial recognition of needed safeguards should
be codified if stipulations are to be allowed. Such legislation would
assist in protecting against abuse, and would serve to recognize the
existence of unequal bargaining power in those cases where desperate
defendants grasp at questionable arrangements. Further, legislation
must resolve the inherent problems of multiple testing. The stipulation
is normally based on a single test, with subsequent testing occurring
only when the losing party is discontent. Despite the absence of an
agreement, the additional examination may be desirable since it implicitly affronts credibility and furthers the primary purpose of crossexamination by impeaching the prior testimony. While it may seem
fundamentally unfair to stipulate and then force another examination
before the court, the fairness contemplated by Valdez would be hollow without some guarantee of accuracy.
Valdez also requires that a warning be given to the jury. 149 As
stated, the judge must instruct the jury that the polygraph results
alone do not establish or disprove guilt, but merely are corroborative. 150 It is inadvisable, however, for the instruction to be so limited.
Additional warnings are needed to reduce the aura of infallibility
which currently surrounds the machine and to ensure that the evidence truly will be treated as corroborative rather than controlling.
Statutory incorporation of an instruction which specifically outlines
the inherent inaccuracies of the technique would prevent undue reliance by the jury and would assure systematic utilization of polygraph
testimony. As a suggested approach,'51 this writer proposes the following instruction:

"' Valdez, 91 Ariz. at 283-84, 371 P.2d at 900-01; see supra notes 104-05 and accompanying
text.
'4 Valdez, 91 Ariz. at 283-84, 371 P.2d at 900-01.
o Id.: see supra text accompanying note 148.
'5 Other authors have advocated a different instruction:
The theory of the lie detector is that it records the physiological manifestations of the
emotional disturbance caused by consciously lying. It is possible that a witness may
give false testimony, but because of poor memory, lapse of time or the excitement of
the occasion, be unaware of the fact that his testimony is false. In such a situation the
lie detector will not detect the untruth. Therefore, I must admonish you not to give
undue weight to a diagnosis of truth, but to realize that the witness may be
unconsciously lying. It is for you, the jury, after considering the witness' demeanor,
the entire testimony, and all the evidence, to ultimately determine the truth or
falsity of the testimony.
Streeter & Belli, "The Fourth Degree": The Lie Detector, 5 VAND. L. REV. 549, 557 (1952).
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MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
You have heard testimony from a polygraph examiner who expressed an opinion as to the defendant's truthfulness based on the
results of a test. Normally, scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge is required to certify an individual as an expert; however, even when this exists, the testimony need not be accepted as
valid. As with other expert testimony, polygraph evidence may be
disregarded if you so choose, as its weight is measured solely by
you. In making that decision, the polygraph should be viewed as
unique. Unlike some other scientific tests, its accuiracy is questioned
by many knowledgeable persons. The court notes that the underlying theory of the polygraph has never been proven accurate. Further, subjectivity in the performance and interpretation of the
examination could result in inaccuracy. The examiner's testimony
alone does not prove or disprove any element of the crime. You are
warned to scrutinize carefully all other testimony to assure sufficient corroboration before accepting the veracity of the test.
While a careful codification of the Valdez standards will increase
the level of protection, supplemental enactments may be needed to
reduce inaccuracy. For example, a statute authorizing an unobtrusive
52
videotaping, which has been suggested by a number of authorities,1
53
would permit review of the examination.
This is necessary because
standard polygraph reports may fail to reveal sources of error. To
illustrate, intonations in the examiner's delivery of the questions may
produce emotion in the subject. Even if unintentional, such an accusatory tone may result in unexplained tension and an erroneous conclusion of guilt. Videotaping the examination or viewing the proceedings
via a one-way mirror would not interfere with the process and would
provide a record by which the skill of the examiner could be evaluated. 54

This instruction is inadequate as it unduly suggests that only unconscious lying goes undetected. In reality, lying, whether intentional or unconscious, may be reported as truth, and
honesty as a falsity. The better approach is for the court to leave the cross-examination for the
attorneys but to charge the jury with specific admonishments which stress the polygraph's
questionable theory, likelihood of error, and, most important, the need for corroborating
testimony.
152 See, e.g.. Pemberton, supra note 2, at 27-28.
'51 Several states require permanent recording of the subject's cardiovascular and respiratory
patterns. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, 2403, § 3 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1983-1984); Ky.
REv. STAT. § 329.020 (1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.1704 (West 1976). Nevada further
requires the permanent recording of change in skin resistance. NEV. REV. STAT. § 648A.200(l)(b)
(1981). None of the statutes reviewed by the author require videotaping of examination sessions.
154 Pemberton, supra note 2, at 74-75 (citing Note, Pinocchio'sNew Nose, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV.
339, 354 (1973)). Pemberton suggests, however, that although the one-way mirror would permit
monitoring of the test just as easily as videotaping, the latter provides a more accurate method of
review. Id.
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Therefore, when the results are to be used at trial, legislation
requiring videotaping is advisable. Through this procedure the examiner could better explain how he arrived at a particular outcome, and
the judge and jury would be able to make a more accurate assessment
of the conduct of both the subject and the examiner. Consequently,
the procedure would make apparent any questionable testing procedures and ultimately would serve to increase the precision and caution
exercised by the examiner.
The expertise of the polygraph examiner is of the utmost importance. 155 Recognizing this, some states have adopted licensing statutes
which require polygraph examiners to possess certain minimum qualifications,15 and which provide for review of these qualifications by a
licensing board. 5 7 Typically, a combination of general education and
experience, 58 approved polygraph coursework, 5 9 an internship,160
' See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 737 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 424 U.S.
973 (1976); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 427, 313 N.E.2d 120, 124 (1974); see
Horvath & Reid, supra note 43, at 276 (finding in one study evaluations of polygraph cha'rts by
experienced examiners were substantially more accurate than those conducted by inexperienced
examiners (less than six months' experience)).
"' See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-2201 to -2225 (1979 & Cur. Supp. 1983): CA. CODE ANN. §§
43-36-1 to -16 (1982 & Cum. Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111,
2401-2432 (Smith-Hurd
Cum. Supp. 1983-1984); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 329.010 to .990 (1983): licni. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
338.1701 to .1729 (West 1976 & Cun. Supp. 1983-1984): MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 73-29-1 to -49
(1972 & Supp. 1983); NEv. REV. STAT. § 648A.010 to .290 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-26-1
to -17 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 1451-1476 (West Cum. Supp.
1982-1983); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (29cc) §§ 1-30 (Vernon 1976 & Cui. Supp.
1982-1983); VA. CODE §§ 54-916 to -922 (1982).
117 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-2204 (1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-36-3 (1982); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 111,
2407, § 7 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1983-1984): Ky. REV. STAT. § 329.030
(1983): MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 338.1705, .1710, .1717 (West 1976); MIss. CODE ANN. §§
73-29-7, -9, -13 (1972 & Supp. 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 648A.080, .130 (1981); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 61-26-5 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 1455, 1456, 1458 (West Cum. Supp. 19821983); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (29cc) §§ 5, 6, 8 (Vernon 1976 & Cum. Supp. 19821983); VA. CODE §§ 54-917, -919 (1982).
"I The following states require either a college degree or a high school diploma and five years
of investigative experience: GA. CODE ANN. § 43-36-6(5) (1982): MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §
338.1710(d) (West 1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 648A.130(1)(c)(1981): OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §
1458(5)(a)(West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983). Some states perim it either a college degree or five years
investigative experience, e.g.. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-2207(5) (1976); MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-2913(5) (1972); TFx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (29ce) § 8(a)(2) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 19821983). Illinois requires a college degree. ILL, ANN. STAT. ch. 111, 2412, § 11 (c) (Smith-Hurd
Cum. Supp. 1983-1984). Statutes in the following states do not specifically require general
education or experience: Ky. REV. STAT. § 329.030 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-26-7 (1983);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-31-07 (Cum. Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 54-918 (1982).
"I E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 1-2207(6) (1979): GA. CODE ANN. § 43-36-5 (6) (1982); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 111, 2412, § 11 (D) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1983-1984): Ky. REV. STAT. § 329.030
(2)(d)(1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-29-13(6) (1972): NEV. REv, STAT. § 648A.130(l)(d) (1981);
N,D. CENT. CODE.§ 43-31-07 (5) (Cum. Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1458 (5)(b)
(West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (29cc) § 8(a)(3) (Vernon
Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
"I See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-2207(6) (1979); CA. CODE ANN. § 43-36-6(7) (1982): KY. REv.
32
STAT. §
9.030(2)(c) (1983); MicH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 338.1710(e) (\West 1976); Miss. CODE
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and standardized testing 6 ' are required. The absence of minimum
statutory standards increases the burden on the judiciary to ascertain
expertise. Legislatures in jurisdictions lacking such statutes should
move quickly toward the introduction and adoption of such standards. Conversely, it should be noted that the existence of a licensing
statute should not limit a court's ability to inquire further into an
examiner's credentials. 6 2 Considering the dramatic influence the examiner's testimony can interject at trial, a court should have the
option to evaluate the level of actual experience, 6 3 potential bias, and
any other challenge brought by interested persons concerning the
64
examiner's abilities.
Finally, it has been said that the polygraph is primarily a psychological approach to the assessment of truth or deception. 6 , Inadequate psychological training creates a grave danger of incorrect decisions by the examiner on questions of mental instability, abnormal

ANN. § 73-29-13 (6)(1972); NEV. REv. STAT. § 648A.130(2)(a) (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-3107 (5)(Cum. Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1458 (5)(b)(West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983);
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (29cc) § 8(a)(3) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
8I See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-2207(7) (1979); GA. CODE. ANN. § 43-36-6 (8)(1982); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 111, 2412, § ll(B)(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1983-1984); Ky. REV. STAT. § 329.030
(5)(1983); MicH. CoMp. LAWs ANN. § 338.1710(k)(West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-26-7
(1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-31-07 (4) (Cum. Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1458
(5)(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (29cc) § 8 (a)(4)
(Vernon Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
112 Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 429-30, 313 N.E.2d 120, 126 (1974),
(trial
judge's discretion should not be limited by formulating strict minimum standards for qualification of polygraph experts); see Valdez, 91 Ariz. at 283, 371 P.2d at 900 (1962) (admissibility of
test results is subject to discretion of trial judge).
1"3 The contrast between the level of experience required by a licensing standard and the level
of actual acquired experience can be dramatic. For example, a Nevada polygraph license
applicant must have completed at least 250 polygraphic examinations (usually during an internship). NEv. REV. STAT. § 648A.130(2)(b) (1981). By contrast, Charles Zimmerman who was
offered as an expert in one case, had conducted over 20,000 polygraph examinations. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 430 n.7, 313 N.E.2d 120, 126 n.7 (1974).
164 In McLemore v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 748-49, 275 N.W.2d 692, 696-97 (1979), the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a stipulation to admit polygraph evidence does not preclude
a criminal defendant from introducing evidence to impeach the credibility of the polygraph
examiner at an admissibility hearing outside the presence of the jury. Wisconsin does not have a
licensing statute. The conflict arose because at the time of the trial the examiner had been placed
on probation by the American Polygraph Association. Id. at 744-45, 275 N.W.2d at 694-95. In
commenting on the McLemore decision, one author suggested that the impeachment evidence
should be heard by the jury. Note, Polygraph Evidence-Impeachment of Polygraph Examiner
Testimony by Defense Experts Allowed at Admissibility Hearing, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 143, 155
(1979). It should be noted that two years after the McLemore decision, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court ruled that polygraph evidence is not to be admitted in any criminal proceeding unless a
stipulation was entered on or before September 1, 1981. State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 279, 307
N.W.2d 628, 653 (1981).
65 Abrams, supra note 2, at 99; see supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
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response patterns, and psychological evasion techniques. 1 61 Accordingly, when polygraph testimony is to be utilized at trial, it is recommended that legislation require a psychologist or psychiatrist to accompany the polygraph operator during the testing in order to assist in
important psychological judgments. Obviously this would entail additional expense to the parties, but the substantial risk of grievous error
associated with the testing process mandates the adoption of this
safeguard.
IX. CONCLUSION

As a truth-finding technique, polygraph testing has a blemished
record. A variety of factors, including the personality of the subject
and the ability of the examiner to detect sources of error, affect the
accuracy of the technique. 6 7 Increasing numbers of courts nevertheless admit polygraph evidence when the parties so stipulate. The
decision to stipulate, however, merely reflects the parties' willingness
to agree to admit the results prior to knowing the outcome of the test.
The stipulation procedure does not alleviate the many sources of
inaccuracy. Indeed, if polygraph results are admitted, the jury is
exposed to unduly influential and potentially faulty evidence which
unfortunately may prove determinative of the ultimate issue of guilt
or innocence. In short, the integrity of the criminal justice system is
sacrificed when convictions and acquittals can be based on conclusions drawn from questionable technology. If this is to be avoided,

166 Professor Skolnick has pointed out the importance of the examiner's training in clinical and
social psychology. Skolnick, supra note 28, at 707. Reid and Inbau likewise emphasize the
significance of psychological training and note that the six month course offered at the Reid
College of the Detection of Deception in Chicago, Illinois includes such training as part of the
curriculum. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 7, at 305.
"67The Office of Technology Assessment's recently released study reviewed, inter alia, the
various factors which affect polygraph examination validity and concluded that these factors
suggest:
[T]here is a great deal more to understand about polygraph tests before one can be
assured of their validity. Despite our lack of full understanding, however, several
factors that affect validity are known. In part, the history of polygraph development
over the past 15 to 20 years has been to systematize and improve polygraph procedures based on these factors. One central problem, not adequately addressed by
either the literature on improvements in validity or countermeasures, is the extent to
which these factors affect numbers of inconclusives. For policy purposes, clearly
such distinctions and a sense of the magnitude of false decisions is needed. Substantial research, beyond what is currently available, would have to be conducted in
order to answer such questions.
Id. at 92.

314

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:285

jurisdictions which favor admissibility of polygraph evidence by stipulation should adopt the suggested legislation as a means of scrutinizing
the polygraph process and determining the proper weight to be accorded its results. This would acknowledge that there is no mystical
pathway to truth.

